AN AFFIRMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:
THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
RESOLUTION OF FEDERALISM
CONFLICTS
Surely there can be no more fundamental constitutional question
than that of the intention of the Framers of the Constitution as to
how authority should be allocated between the National and State
Governments.1
The Supreme Court is currently faced with a direct conflict over
allocation of federal and state authority.2 State and municipal officials are attempting to use the tenth amendment as a shield against
extensive federal regulations of local government functions.3 The
tests presently applied to resolve such controversies are poorly defined, 4 and judicial dissatisfaction with them has been expressed. 5
This discontent may be based on more than the inadequacy of the
tests as tools for analysis, for indications exist that the Burger
Court is becoming increasingly responsive to claims of state auton1. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. National League of Cities v. Usery, No. 74-878 (U.S., filed Jan. 17,
1975). The petitioners initially applied for injunctive or declaratory relief
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. National
League of Cities v. Brennan, 75 CCH L C 33,182 (1974-75). Acting as Circuit Justice, Chief Justice Warren Burger granted a stay. 75 CCH L C
33,183 (1974-75). The case was argued April 16, 1975, and restored to the
calendar for reargument on May 27, 1975. National League of Cities v. Dunlop, 421 U.S. 986 (1975). Scheduled for reargument sub noma. National
League of Cities v. Usery, 44 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
Congress extended coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act to nonsupervisory municipal and state employees, including police and firemen. Pub.
L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1974). This action will remove from local control the ability to determine these employees' wages and hours. The budgetary impact of this action is severe:
Wages will be increased; overtime compensation rates will be in effect
much more frequently, for compensatory time off is barred; and a complex,
expensive reporting system is required. Brief for Appellant, National
League of Cities v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S., filed Jan. 17, 1975).
3. Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act wage and hour provisions to nonsupervisory municipal and state employees is at issue. The Supreme Court has considered imposition of federal regulations on state agencies in cases such as Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) and United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). See also Casto, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. Rnv. 227 (1949).
4. See text accompanying notes 39-47 infra.
5. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 551-52, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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omy.0 In deciding these controversies, the Court should employ a
test which allows greater consideration of federalism 7 concerns.
This Comment will determine which tests the Court has used in
the past to weigh the competing considerations of federalism and
will analyze possible new models.
A FEDEaALIsm PERSPECTIVE
The Tenth Amendment
The tenth amendment 8 is understood best as a "symbolic device
of the powers not delegated to Congress" 9 and as a guarantee of
the rights reserved to the states.' 0 In this sense it is a crystallization of the balance of power struck in the Constitution between
the federal and state governments. A few authorities believe that
the embodiment of this affirmation in the form of an amendment
is significant.' Others urge that it is merely tautologous. 12 Those
6. See notes and text accompanying notes 44-47, 74-75, 99-100 infra.
7. Federalism in the United States embraces the following elements:
(1) as in all federations, the union of several autonomous political entities, or "States," for common purposes; (2) the division
of legislative powers between a "National Government," on the
one hand, and constituent "States," on the other, which division
is governed by the rule that the former is "a government of

enumerated powers" while the latter are governments of "residual powers"; (3) the direct operation, for the most part, of each
of these centers of government, within its assigned sphere, upon
all persons and property within its territorial limits; (4) the provision of each center with the complete apparatus of law en-

forcement, both executive and judicial; (5) the supremacy of the

"National Government" within its assigned sphere over any conflicting assertion of "State" power; (6) dual citizenship. CoN-

GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERIcA, AxALYsIS AND INTERPRETATION,

Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1972).

8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X states:

S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d

"The powers not delegated to the

United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
9. Interview with Paul Brest, Associate Professor of Constitutional Law,
Stanford University, in San Diego, Jan. 16, 1976.
10. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 595 (1946) (Douglas &
Black JJ., dissenting).
11. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
553 (1975), described the tenth amendment as "an affirmative constitutional
right" of the states, similar to the affirmative rights of individuals in the
first and fifth amendments.
The amendment form itself has been urged to be significant because
of the rule of constitutional interpretation that if some inconsistency exists
between a constitution as originally adopted and a subsequent provision
added by amendment, the latter will prevail. Casto, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. REv.227, 228 (1949).
12. Justice Stone described the tenth amendment as "a truism that all

presenting the latter view find support in the debates surrounding
the ratification of the tenth amendment. 18
The Constitution was drafted in recognition of the inadequacies
of the Articles of Confederation. 14 Unlike the Articles, however,
the Constitution did not clearly delineate federal and state powers. 15 The delegates at the Constitutional Convention feared state
encroachment on national authority.1 6 Nevertheless, when the document was presented to state ratifying conventions, there was great
concern over broad federal powers. Ratification was achieved only
after the convention delegates understood that a Bill of Rights, including limitations on the national government contained in the
tenth amendment, would be added.17
When the proposed amendment was discussed at the First Congress, the word expressly was suggested as a limitation on the powers delegated to the United States.18 Although the proposal was
rejected, the state legislatures ratified the amendment.' 0 The Federalists 20 used the rejection of this limitation as support for the
proposition that national government is supreme in the exercise of
its enumerated powers and has no duty either to consider the coexistence of the states or to maintain any particular relationship of
is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941).

Professor Brest suggested that in cases involving fed-

eralism the Supreme Court's decisions would have been the same even if
the tenth amendment did not exist. Interview with Paul Brest, Associate

Professor of Constitutional Law, Stanford University, in San Diego, Jan. 16,
1976.
13. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); Gillmore, Governor
Meldrum Thompson and the Tenth Amendment, 16 N.H.B.J. 246, 249, 257

(1975).

14. See generally M. FAmLsm, TnE FRaAmG OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1937).

15. Article II reads: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." ARTIcLES or CONFEDERATION, in 1 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTIrTTION 79 (1836).
16. Id. at 432.
17. See C. BLOCH, STATES' RIGnTS, THE LAw oF T=E LAND 17-25 (1958).
See generally Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution 1789-1889,
in 2 AMERICAN IhSTORiCAL ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1896, at 165
(1897).

18. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
19. See E. CORWiN, THE CONSTrUTION

(8th ed. 1946).

CONSTITUTION 608 (1836).
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY

20. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
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power with the states.21 In recognition of one of its ardent proponents, 22 this view is designated Hamiltonian. The contrasting
Madisonian approach characterizes our nation as a compact of free
states, delegating power to a central government to act in interstate
and international matters and leaving the states themselves free
23
to regulate internal concerns.
An Approach to FederalismDecisions
These conflicting theories on the balance of power in the United
States have been evident in the decisions of the Supreme Court
when it is faced with a federalism problem. 24 The contested issue
in all federalism controversies is an exercise of power by either
the federal government or a state government which potentially
infringes on the sovereignty of the other. The Court uses a variety
of tests to facilitate decisionmaking in examining the validity of
regulations resulting from such exercises of power. This Comment
will analyze federalism cases to determine which factors have been
identified in constructing tests.
There are two standards that characterize the possible impact of
governmental regulation. The legislation in question will be invalidated if it becomes a burden or hindrance on a certain activity.
The legislation will also be struck down if it singles out or discriminates against a particular activity. The Court applies the burden
and discrimination standards to a number of activities; for example,
21. Cowen, What Is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REv.
154, 157 (1961); Casto, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. REv. 227, 228 (1949).
22. Hamilton wrote of the new Union: "A government ought to contain
in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects
committed to its care .

.

. free from every other control, but a regard to

the public good, and to the sense of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 31,
at 195 (J. Cooke ed. 1956) (A. Hamilton). See E. CoRwn, TWMIGHT OF TB
SuPREmE CouRT 47, 48 (1934).

23. Madison described the relationship as: "[T]he powers proposed to
be lodged in the Federal Government, are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensibly necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union ...

(J. Cooke ed. 1956) (J. Madison).

."

THE FEERAMST No. 46, at 323

See Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth

Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REV. 154, 157 (1961).
24. E. CoRwiN, TWIIGHT OF THE SUPmME CouRT 47-48 (1934).

a state enterprise undertaken in its sovereign capacity or flow of
goods in interstate commerce. The application of standards to a
given activity determines the validity of specific governmental regulations. If a sovereign state government function, such as allocation of tax revenue, is the activity in question, the test might be:
"Does the regulation burden or impair the state government
function?" or, "Does the regulation discriminate against the state
government function?" A finding that the statute is discriminatory
or excessively burdensome will result in the invalidation of the regulation.
Federalism decisions 25 fall into two broad categories: either regulation by one governmental entity directly upon the other's functions as a sovereign or regulation of all other activities which may
be engaged in by both private and governmental entities. These
categories may be further divided into two groups separating state
and federal exercises of power. This analysis results in four
classes: federal regulation of sovereign state functions, federal regulation of other matters, state regulation of sovereign federal functions, and state regulation of other matters. These divisions will
be used to examine federalism tests.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIEs

FederalRegulation of State Functions

Through the exercise of its enumerated powers, the federal government may regulate certain state functions. Challenges to these
regulations have been resolved using variations of the burden and
discrimination standards. Because enactments based on the taxing
or commerce powers have frequently come under attack, tests employed by the Court to settle these conflicts are well-developed.
1. Taxing Power
During the late nineteenth century, initial federal attempts to tax
income 26 or interest 27 generated by a state or municipal government
25. Although these cases will be examined only for their resolution of
conflicting federalism concerns, other values, such as individual rights, may
of course be involved. The addition of these factors may affect the resolution of the fundamental power struggle. In some instances, the Court seems
to prefer to base its decision on federalism considerations rather than to
deal with an equal protection or due process issue. See generally Note,
Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).

26. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) (state judge's income
exempt from federal taxation).
27. United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1872)
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were rebuffed as too burdensome. The Supreme Court expressed
its rationale in this way: "If [government instruments and agen-

cies] may be taxed lightly, they may be taxed heavily; if justly,
impeded and may be deoppressively. Their operation may be 28
stroyed, if any interference is permitted."
This deference continued into the 1930's but was diminished by
recognition of the federal government's right to tax states engaged
in private business. 2 9 The ability to tax came to rest on a distinction between proprietary functions, which were taxable, and governmental functions, which were exempt. This distinction encompasses burden and discrimination standards. Because true government activities were not being taxed, any burden on the state as
a sovereign was insubstantial. Additionally, a state which engaged
in business of a private nature became subject to the same taxes
as any individual involved in that business.
By the end of the decade, the burden rationale was applied
stringently to taxation of state government agents. State employees lost their immunity from federal income taxation, for they could
not demonstrate that "the burden upon the state function [was]
actual and substantial, not conjectural." 30
Increasingly diverse government functions led the Court in New
York v. United States to reject the governmental versus proprietary
distinction. 31 Although a majority agreed that New York State's
water bottling business was taxable, the justices could not concur
in which test should be used to determine the legitimacy of the
tax.8 2 Justice Frankfurter, applying the discrimination standard,
(federal imposition of tax on interest received by a city on railroad bonds
was denied).

28. Id. at 327-28. The zealous protection of the states was an outgrowth
of a perception of the state and federal government as competing "dual sovereignties." This doctrine held that "the States within the limits of their
powers not granted, or, in the language of the tenth amendment, 'reserved,'
are as independent of the general government as that government within
its sphere is independent of the States." Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 113, 124 (1871).
29. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state-owned liquor store subject to federal taxation).
30. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 421 (1938).
31. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
32. Justice Douglas' dissent, concurred in by Justice Black, relied heavily
on the tenth amendment to reject any taxation on states. Id. at 590-98.

deemed any tax valid if its subject was a revenue generating activity, regardless of who engaged in it. 3 3 The only restriction was
that the activity must not be one which a state was uniquely capable of performing. Chief Justice Stone, employing both standards, stated that a constitutional federal tax must neither discriminate nor unduly interfere with a function of state government.8 4
A period of flux in applying the burden and discrimination standards culminated in the New York case, the Court's last major confrontation with claims of state government immunity from federal
taxes. The federal government's ability to tax state employees' income had been accepted because this power did not substantially
burden the states. However, the Supreme Court left unresolved
the question of whether a federal tax on a state agency was constitutionally required to be merely nondiscriminatory or both nondiscriminatory and nonburdensome.
2. Commerce Power
In the early twentieth century federal regulations under the commerce power mushroomed. State functions became increasingly diverse. Conflict arose when states claimed the tenth amendment
protected their business activities from federal controls. United
States v. California" presented this problem at a time when the
validity of federal taxation of state agencies was determined by the
governmental-proprietary distinction. Application of this distinction to conflicts under the commerce power was rejected with a
phrase that expressed both burden and discrimination standards.
The Court concluded that federal regulation would prevail, for "[it]
is as capable of being obstructed by state as by individual action."80,
Under this approach the focus of the burden standard apparently
shifts when an exercise of the commerce power is questioned. The
Court prohibits interference with either the purpose or provisions
of a federal statute.
33. Id. at 582. Justice Frankfurter emphasized the passage of tax measures by Congress, which is composed of the representatives of all the
states. Id. at 582-83. This argument foreshadows Herbert Wechsler's analysis that because Congress expresses local interests, it acts as the guardian
of federalism in our political system. H. WEcnsYLER, PuiNcrPLEs, PoLIxcs,
AND FU FDAmx

AL LAW

49-82 (1961). In dissent Justice Douglas countered

this view with an assertion that "the sovereign position of the States" must
not depend on "the will of a transient majority." New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946).
34. 326 U.S. at 588.
35. 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (state-owned railroad held to be subject to the
Federal Safety Appliance Act).
36. Id. at 186.
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Relying on the strong precedent of California, subsequent deci-

sions rarely treated claims of state sovereignty as sufficiently significant to warrant forceful refutations.37 Not until a state's immunity from a citizen suit brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act was in issue3 8 did the Court again analyze the implications of intrusive federal regulations. The governmental-proprietary distinction, which contemplates discrimination and burden on
the state, was employed to uphold the federal enactment. When
a state right of near-constitutional proportions was denied, state
sovereignty replaced federal purposes as the subject of the burden
standard. More intrusive federal measures were met with greater
judicial scrutiny.
Maryland v. Wirtz3 9 presents the Court's most articulate recent
consideration of the application of commerce-based regulations to
state activities. Drawing on justifications used in applying commerce regulations to private industry, the majority upheld the extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to state school and hospital employees. 40 Potential labor disputes4 1 or unfair competition 42 had been established as tests for the validity of federal con37. Imposition of federal regulations was also upheld in United States
v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966), rev'g per curiam, 354 F.2d 549 (1965) (state liable for penalties for exceeding wheat acreage allotment on its prison farm)
and California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957) (F.E.L.A. rules applicable
to state in its capacity as railroad employer).
38. The Court allowed a state to be sued by an employee of its railroad.
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964).
39. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
40. Justice Douglas dissented, characterizing the decision as "such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that
it is in my view, not consistent with our constitutional federalism." Id. at
201.
41. The basis for this theory is that labor strife will disrupt the interstate
flow of goods. It was developed in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). Both the labor dispute and unfair competition tests (note
42 infra) were applied in Wirtz through the "enterprise concept." This application allowed extending coverage of federal regulations to one whose
fellow employee in the same enterprise was already subject to federal control The majority rebuffed attacks on this concept by holding that its constitutionality had been settled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), which dealt with federal regulations of private industry.
42. This justification was also used in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941). It provides that interstate commerce shall not be the medium
through which goods produced under substandard labor conditions may
compete unfairly with those having higher prices because of greater costs

trols in private business. Both of these tests employ the burden
standard. Labor strife may interrupt the free flow of goods among
the states; unfair competition detracts from the goal of a national
free market. The Court used the discrimination standard to justify
subjecting state activities to the same analysis as private activities. 4U
Recent cases reflect a growing consideration for claims of state
sovereignty. Although the initial application of FLSA to state employees was upheld in Wirtz, the Court subsequently recognized the
special character of state employers and refused to allow employee
suits for breach of these standards. 44 In an apparent attempt to
reconcile this decision with prior case law, the Court held that in
the interests of "harmonious federalism" states would not be open
to suits in the absence of clear congressional intent.4 Apparently
the burden on state autonomy was so great that merely establishing
nondiscriminatory treatment of state and private employers was insufficient to justify this regulation.
In 1975, the Court upheld wage and price controls passed under
the commerce power as they applied to state employees. 46 Using
the burden standard, the majority held that the exclusion of state
employees would impair the effectiveness of the federal program.
However, the holding was narrow, stressing the temporary use of
controls as an emergency measure. The majority opinion emphasized the continued validity of the tenth amendment as a federalism
47
check, stating that "it is not without significance."
incurred in providing adequate working conditions. Justice Frankfurter
may have foreseen the applicability of these rationales to state activities.
In upholding a federal tax on a state activity, he stated: "[New York] is
engaged in an enterprise in which the State sells mineral waters in c~mpetition with private waters...." New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
581 (1946).
43. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968).
44. In Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.

279 (1973), the Court was faced with the attempt of state employees
to sue for violations of the FLSA amendments. An additional consideration
was the immunity from suit granted to the States in the eleventh amendment. Although this immunity was deemed inadequate to bar an employee
action in Parden (see note 38 supra) the Court in Employees v. Department
of Public Health & Welfare "decline[d] to extend Parden to cover
every exercise by Congress of its commerce power, where the purpose
of Congress to give force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty
of the States ... is not clear." Id. at 286-87.
45. Id. at 286.
46. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975).
47. Justice Marshall wrote: "While the Tenth Amendment has been
characterized as a 'truism,' stating merely that 'all is retained which has
not been surrendered,' [citation omitted] it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
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Early decisions used the discrimination standard and the burden
standard to focus on federal goals or programs in assessing commerce-based regulations. Recent cases may indicate a shift in the
burden standard to include consideration of interference with state
autonomy.
State Regulation of FederalGovernment Functions
This section will examine state attempts to tax federal government agents or agencies. Claims of immunity have been raised
against state levies, whether exacted in the form of income, property, sales, or excise tax. The initial assertions of federal immunity
were resolved in M'Culloch v. Maryland.4 8 Chief Justice Marshall
easily disposed of a tenth amendment argument 49 by holding that
a state could not tax operations of the national bank, for such a
tax would burden the federal government in carrying out its enumerated powers. 0
In subsequent cases, the Court carefully employed the burden
standard, elaborating on the fact that certain state taxes interfered
with the effectuation of a delegated power of the federal government.r1 This emphasis on the limited nature of the federal government has led the Court to conclude that because "government denot exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. at 547 n.7.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, attacked the decision as being one in a line
of cases undermining state autonomy. He criticized federal regulation of
state activities under the aegis of the commerce power and called for Maryland v. Wirtz to be overruled. Id. at 558-59. This dissent was handed down
the same day that National League of Cities v. Usery was scheduled for
reargument.

G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW

126 (1975).
48. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
49. Chief Justice Marshall, a Federalist, seized this opportunity to state
his adherence to the Hamiltonian view of the balance of power. He emphasized the omission of "expressly" in drafting the amendment and stated that
it "was framed for the purpose of quieting excessive jealousies which had
been excited." Id. at 406. He added that "the government of the Union,
though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action." Id.
at 405. See also Gillmore, Governor Meldrum Thompson and the Tenth
Amendment, 16 N.H.B.J. 246, 251 (1975).
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819).
51. E.g., Wisconsin Cent'l R.R. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890)
(the property power); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 179-80
(1886) (the taxing and spending powers).

rives its authority wholly from powers delegated to it by the Constitution, its every action within its constitutional power is governmental action... ,"52 By giving every act the imprimatur of a governmental act, the Court avoided the definitional difficulties of the
governmental-proprietary distinction encountered with state taxation immunities. State taxation of any federal act is, therefore, a
tax on a governmental act and thus an impermissible burden on
federal autonomy.
This blanket immunity was originally enjoyed by federal employees 53 and third parties having business dealings with the federal
government. 54 During the 1930's, the Court radically curtailed the
policy of granting private individuals immunities from state taxation.5 5 Many earlier decisions were overturned 0 when the Court
began allowing exemptions only if taxation would be a substantial
burden on the federal government. 57 In recent years the discrimination standard has also been applied. State taxation of individual
citizens must be neither burdensome on the federal government nor
8
discriminatory on the basis of relationship with government.5
Today state taxes are evaluated by the Court using discrimination
and burden standards to grant absolute immunity to federal gov
52. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939).
53. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
54. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (sales made to
federal government not subject to state sales tax); Long v. Rockwood, 277
U.S. 142 (1928) (income from royalties derived from patents granted by
the United States not taxable); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922)
(income derived from lease of federal land not taxable). But cf. Metcalf
& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (net income received for engineering work for the federal government taxable by the state). The opinion
reveals no discernible basis for this aberrant result.
55. Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARv.
L. R-v.633 (1945).
56. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939), subjected the income of an employee of a federal government agency to state
taxation and specifically overruled New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299
U.S. 401 (1937), on this point. State taxation of income from copyright royalties was allowed in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), which
overruled Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).
57. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480, 487 (1939).
58. United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) (state tax may
not discriminate against the federal government or those with whom it
deals). In recent years the burden standard has been applied unevenlyat times rewarding the clever contract draftsman. Compare Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), which upheld state sales taxation paid
by a contractor who was working on a "cost plus" arrangement for the federal government, with Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954),
which invalidated a similar tax in a similar situation, in which the contractor was specifically authorized to act as purchasing agent for the government which was directly responsible to the seller.
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ernment agencies5" and select immunities to private individuals
dealing with the federal government. 60
REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENTITIES

FederalGovernment Regulations
Federalism conflicts have occurred most frequently in actions
challenging congressional regulation of intrastate activities through
the exercise of the commerce power. This section will focus on
those decisions.
Large-scale regulatory action inaugurated by Congress at the
turn of the twentieth century touched off extensive litigation on
the right of the federal government to control local activities. 1
The Court resisted initial federal attempts to regulate intrastate
acts which had only an indirect effect on commerce. 62 Unless the
activities either interfered with channels of interstate commerce or
impaired federal regulatory measures, they were beyond the reach
of the commerce power. The Court was again applying the burden
standard. In addition these early cases employed another criterion
-establishing a distinction between police power and commerce
power. Federal provisions which were seen as attempts to exercise
police power were struck down. Reservation of police power to the
states was regarded as "essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government." 63
Until the mid-1940's, cases determining the validity of congressional regulation often used the direct-indirect effect criterion 4 and
police power-commerce power distinction. 5 Although a number of
59. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339
(1968) (immunity of national banks); Department of Employment v.
United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966) (immunity of American National Red
Cross).
60. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
61. E. CoRwm, TnE Cowcwnc POWER VERsus STATES RIGHTS 152 (1936).
62. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
63. Id. at 13. The Court's reference to "our dual form of government"
is an allusion to the theory of "dual sovereignty," which was popular at
the time. See note 28 supra.
64. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
65. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). This appears to be the
final use of the police power-commerce power distinction, one which had
little basis in either law or logic.

other characterizations were employed during this period, they are
variations on the burden standard. Goods or activities were subject
to federal rules if they were in the "stream of commerce,"0 6 harmed
interstate commerce,67 bore a "close and substantial relation to interstate commerce," 6 s or were harmful per se and thus "polluted"
commerce.6 9
In 1941, United States v. Darby7 0 introduced the test still used
today for evaluating exercises of the commerce power. Although
the federal statute extends to intrastate activities, it will be upheld
71
if it is an "appropriate means" to reach the "legitimate end" of
the regulation of interstate commerce. Any limitation which might
have been found in the tenth amendment was dismissed, for "[t] he
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. ' 72 The means-end test is a combination of the
burden and discrimination standards. A valid objective for Congress in exercising the commerce power is to protect interstate commerce from being impaired or burdened. The means used to accomplish this end must not discriminate against intrastate activities.
Throughout the years the Court has employed this malleable test
to sanction increasingly intrusive actions by the federal government.73 The concern for state autonomy evidenced in the discarded
66. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
67. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Houston E. & W. Texas Ry.
v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914). This conception of the commerce power as a protective device may be in greater harmony with the framers' view of the power as chiefly "a negative and preventive provision." Abel, The Commerce Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Mlnw. L. REV. 432, 475 (1941).

68. Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States,
234 U.S. 342 (1914).
69. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903). This

test encompassed federal regulation of harmful acts committed in interstate
commerce as well as of things harmful per se. E.g., Kentucky Whip & Col-

lar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (convict-made goods);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (transporting women for immoral purposes).
70. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
71. Id. at 118.
72. Id. at 124.

73. From 1936 to 1970, no federal law has been invalidated by the Supreme Court on the basis that Congress had exercised a power which belonged solely to the states. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. RFv. 603 (1975). In 1970, the
Court by a bare majority with no shared rationale found federal voting age
standards inapplicable to state elections. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). This case must be distinguished from those decisions examined in
this article. The Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970, which usurped
the right explicitly given to states by art. I, § 4 of the Constitution to de-

termine voter qualifications, was dealt with in Oregon.
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police power distinction has waned under the means-end test with
its decreasing scrutiny of the appropriateness of the means. The
efficacy of this analysis as a federalism check was vitiated when
the Court agreed to defer to congressional determination that a
means-end relationship existed if the justices could perceive "a rational basis" for such a finding.7 4
State Government Regulations
State laws may coincide with federal regulations enacted under
an enumerated power. Alternatively, state laws may deal with a
matter potentially subject to federal control but as yet unregulated.
The validity of state enactments is determined differently if they
are in actual, as opposed to possible, conflict with federal law. In
this section state statutes which might infringe on the commerce

power will be considered.
1.

Negative Implications

The grant of certain powers to the United States carries with
it the negative implication that states may not exercise the same
powers.7 5, Although early cases recognized a state's right to exerIntrusive federal measures authorized using the means-end test were severely criticized by dissenting Justices as violating state autonomy. See,
e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); United
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74. The court in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), stated:
"[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony
before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end."
Id. at 303-04.
The Burger Court may be constricting the broad application of the meansend test in regard to commerce. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.,
419 U.S. 186 (1974), the Court rejected an analysis of conduct regarding a
highway construction ingredient as being per se in commerce because highways are the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, for the analysis
rested "on a purely formal 'nexus' to commerce." Id. at 198. The Court
further stated:
The justification for an expansive interpretation of the "in commerce" language .

.

. would require courts to look to practical con-

sequences, not to apparent and perhaps nominal connections between commerce and activities that may have no significant economic effect on interstate markets. Id. at 198-99.
75. See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL PowER: FEDERAL Am STATE 260-316
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ENGDAHL]. Negative implications should be
distinguished from the explicit prohibition of state action on some matters
by art. I, § 10 of the Constitution. One of these areas forbidden is state
duties on imports which had traditionally been banned as long as the goods

cise its police power in regulating activities, subject to the dormant
federal commerce power,7 6 they did not resolve the question of
whether the commerce power itself was an exclusive grant to the
7
national government. 7
A compromise position was reached in Cooley v. Board of Ward7
eng of the Port of Philadelphia.
Although the decision purported to distinguish state regulations on the basis of their subject
matter, 79 it has come to stand for a broader set of criteria which
determine when the potential power of the commerce clause bars
state regulations. State enactments were not invalidated by the
latent commerce power if they were justifiable in relation to local
needs and peculiarities, but they would be banned if disruptive of
the uniformity necessary for a viable national free market.8 0
The original Cooley test, using the burden standard, focused on
the possible impairment of interstate commerce and was employed
for many years. Subsequently the Court supplemented Cooley by
considering whether the statute in question placed a direct or indirect burden on interstate commerce. 8 ' However, this additional
test was rejected when the Court realized that a mechanical analysis of the burdensome effect produced inequitable results.8 2 The
retained their original character as imports-"the original package doctrine." Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871). This ban was recently
lifted when a nondiscriminatory ad valorem state tax was upheld. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 44 U.S.L.W. 4070 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1976).
76. New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
77. Chief Justice Marshall indicated he found the arguments for exclusive
federal powers convincing in dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824). The Supreme Court reached conflicting results when
confronted with the issue of exclusivity in Thurlow v. Massachusetts (the
License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and Smith v. Turner (the Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 28 (1849). The former held that in the
absence of national legislation no limits on state regulations exist and the
latter, that states lack all power to act in an area that has been delegated
to Congress.
78. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
79. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation
by Congress.... The nature of this subject [port pilotage] is
such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power,
it should be left to the legislation of the States; that it is local and
not national, that it is likely to be best provided for, not by one
system.. . but by... many ....
Id. at 319.
80. ENGDAHL, supranote 75, at 266.
81. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (Note Justice Stone's
dissent criticizing the direct-indirect approach, id. at 43-45.); Port Richmond
& Bergen Point Ferry Co. v. Hudson County, 234 U.S. 317 (1914); Smith
v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
82. California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
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Court also developed a policy of examining the purposes of the stat3
utes. Those which were found discriminatory were invalidated;
those which protected the public health or safety were upheld. 4
Apparently, judicial scrutiny of the purpose of state regulations is
also an application of the discrimination standard.
The Cooley approach has been supplanted in modern decisions
by a process of balancing the burden on interstate commerce against
the benefit accruing to the state.8 5 In using this analysis, the Court
has again considered such factors as the legitimacy of the state
purpose.8 6 This "new" analysis represents a similar emphasis on
the burden standard, with the discrimination standard presenting
supplemental concerns.
2. Preemption
Preemption and negative implications are companion federalism
doctrines. Preemption arises when a state regulation and an existing federal law conflicts 7 Because of the supremacy clause, 8 the
federal law, as an exercise of a delegated power, overrides the state
regulation.8 9 Preemption will be examined in the context of the
commerce clause.
83. ILP. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F.

Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1 (1928).
84. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
85. "The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect
of the law as a safety measure . . . is so slight or problematical as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from in-

terferences which seriously impede it." Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
86. Regulations discriminating against out-of-state interests or unduly
favoring local producers have been invalidated. E.g., Polar Ice Cream &
Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Regulations which were potentially quite
burdensome were upheld if necessary for public health or safety. E.g.,
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). A criterion
which has been employed in conjunction with both the traditional and modern tests has been the presence of conflicting state regulations. Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485

(1878).

87. Conflict may be found in contradictory, complementary, and even
corresponding state and federal legislation. ENGDAHL, supra note 75, at 320-

21.

88. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
89. Hirsch, Towards a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.

Fop- 515.

For many years the test used by the Court in resolving preemption conflicts was that once federal power had been exercised, it
was inherently exclusive of state power over the same subject.?0
This congressional exercise of power has been described as "tak[ing] the particular subject-matter in hand"' 1 and "occupy [ing] the
92
field."
In the late 1930's this absolute bar to state action was gradually
eroded. The modern test is the intent of Congress: An exclusionary intent must be evident before a state regulation will be preempted.9 3 In the absence of clear congressional intent, the Court
looks to a number of indicia to determine the exclusivity of federal
legislation. 4 State regulations will be barred: if their method of
enforcement would interfere with the methods used by the federal
regulations; 95 if they would "disturb and disarrange the statutory
plan Congress set up"; 6 or if diverse state laws would produce confusion impairing congressional goals. 91

Exclusionary intent may

also be found if the subject matter of federal legislation requires
national uniformity. 98 Apparently, both the early and modern preemption tests use the burden standard with federal policy or programs as their focus. Because of the supremacy clause congressional intent, if present, is controlling.
Although the Court has continued to use the same test and indicia, recent decisions have reflected greater deference to state policies and legislation. These cases may either entail sweeping discus90. This view was voiced by Justice Story in his dissent in New York
v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 159 (1837).
91. Charleston & W. Ca. R.R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604
(1915).
92. Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439, 447 (1915).
93. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1933).
94. Criteria not based on burden or discrimination standards have been
applied inconsistently. The existence of a comprehensive federal program
has been seen as an indication of exclusionary intent. E.g., Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). In upholding
a state regulation in conflict with those promulgated by the federal government in its Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, the Court
refused to infer an exclusionary intent from the complexity of the federal
regulations. New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405

(1973).
95. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Nash v. Florida Indust.
Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
96. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691
(1965).
97. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).

98. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Florida
Lime &Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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sions of "Our Federalism," 99 or simply a call for state laws to be
"accommodated."' 10 0 Although the Court has not come full circle
from its early position of absolute exclusivity, a greater awareness
of states' rights and interests now exists.

NEW CIERIA FOR FEDERALISM DECISIONS
In the past, federalism conflicts have been frequently resolved
using tests based on burden and discrimination standards. These
standards are applied to various activities, described here as feder•alism factors, to determine the legitimacy of state and federal regulations. Usually, tests based on the discrimination standard are
applied strictly, barring any discrimination. Tests based on the
burden standard may be applied absolutely, barring any burden,
or quantitatively, barring substantial burdens. In determining how
the test is to be applied, a standard of review is developed.
Federal regulation of state government presents the sharpest conflict between the competing concerns of federalism.1° 1 Possible
tests to resolve competing federal and state claims will be examined.
These tests will be applied by using a hypothetical situation involving a federal regulation under the commerce clause which, as
part of an energy saving program, would require the spotlights on
the statehouse's dome to be shut off.
As a first model for decisionmaking, it has been suggested that
the former distinction of governmental versus proprietary functions
99. [A] recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of
a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and
clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," .... What the concept does represent is a system in which
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It
should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born
in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a
highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971).
100. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 419 (1974). See Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
101. National League of Cities v. Usery, No. 74-878 (U.S., filed Jan. 17,
1975). See note 2 supra.

be revived. 10 2 In the past this test had been used to distinguish
such diverse state activities as managing liquor stores' 03 and administering the capitol building. 10 4 However, well-drawn lines are not
always possible, and Justice Rehnquist proposes that the test be
modified to distinguish between those activities "traditionally undertaken by the State and other activities."' 0 5
This approach presents several problems. For example, "traditionally" must be defined. Does it require state action from the
time of the Revolution or from the time this function became feasible or common? Other questions are whether the activity must
be a traditional function of this state, all states, or states to the
exclusion of private individuals. When the definitional problem is
resolved, a standard of review must be determined. An absolute
ban on federal regulation of an activity recognized as a traditional
governmental function would allow the statehouse dome to remain
illuminated despite the national energy saving plan.
Flexibility could be gained and deference to state autonomy preserved if the federal government were forced to prove a compelling
interest in order to regulate a traditional government function. 00
This position is modeled upon Justice Stone's theory posed in
United States v. Carolene Products0 7 that greater judicial scrutiny
is called for when a fundamental right protected by the first ten
amendments is threatened.10 Applying strict scrutiny to the "traditional" distinction would ameliorate the harshness of a complete
ban approach and force the hypothetical statehouse lights to be
dimmed during an energy crisis.
Another possible standard of review using Justice Rehnquist's
traditional function approach is that of balancing the extent of interference with the traditional activity against the effect of being
exempt from federal regulation. This test would make a blackout
of the statehouse lights possible, but it would also allow more in102. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 558 n.2 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dis-

senting).

103. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934).
104. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
105. Justice Rehnquist characterized the tenth amendment as "an affirmative constitutional right." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553
(1975). If this view is accepted, infringements on tenth amendment
"rights" might be subjected to strict scrutiny and forced to meet the compelling interest test suggested by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
106. Charles Rhyne, attorney for the National League of Cities, argues
that a "higher-than-rational" basis test should be applied to the 1974
amendments to FLSA. Brief for Appellant at 46, National League of Cities
v. Dunlop, No. 74-878 (U.S., filed Jan. 17, 1975).
107. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
108. Id. at 152 n.4.
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trusive federal regulations and be less protective of state sovereignty than a strict scrutiny standard.
This balancing approach to federalism problems was first suggested in conjunction with a different federalism factor-an "indispensable" government function. In Maryland v. Wirtz,10 9 Chief
Judge Thompson employed such a test to determine whether state
school and hospital employees were subject to federal wage and
hour regulations. The distinguishing factor-indispensable-goes
beyond essential and includes only those state activities which "cannot reasonably be supplied to the general public unless the state
Balancing is accomplished by weighing interundertakes them."'1
ference with the indispensable function against the effect of immunizing it from the proposed regulation. If the indispensable factor
is used, the state's traditional role of lighting its capitol building
does not even tip the scales, and the federal regulation would be
allowed.
When, as in Wirtz, a truly indispensable function is found, the
results may be unsatisfactory if the goal is protection of state sovereignty. In Wirtz, the federal wage and hour provisions were allowed to stand despite their serious impact on budgetary determinations in operating state schools and hospitals.
States could be afforded greater protection if either a strict scrutiny or a total ban approach were used in conjunction with the
indispensable function factor. Neither approach would require that
any consideration be given to regulating the lighting of the state
capitol building, for its illumination is not an indispensable function.
The more limited coverage afforded state functions if the discriminant indispensable is used emphasizes the inadequacies of using
either this term or traditional as the federalism factor. By qualifying which state government function is protected from federal
intervention, regulations on a small group of state activities will
undergo the chosen standard of review. All other federal laws will
presumably be upheld automatically if they apply equally to private and state actions."' Litigants will be forced to focus on proving that a certain state activity falls within the protected class.

109. 18 WH

CASES

62, 80 (1967).

110. Comment, Maryland v. Wirtz, 66 MTIcH. L. REv. 750, 769 n.74 (1968).
111. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.

An alternative to this constrictive situation would be a return
to the governmental, as opposed to the proprietary, function as a
federalism factor. A substantial body of case law defining these
terms already exists.'1 " Admittedly, not all governmental functions merit the same degree of protection: Maintaining the capitol
building ranks far below budgeting funds. A gradient system
should be used to determine how extensively this activity should
be shielded from federal intervention. This analysis avoids the
harsh in-or-out of the protected class effect which resulted above.
Moreover, the standard of review used to determine whether a
federal enactment will be applied to a particular government function should be on a variable basis as well; i.e. the more a proposed
measure interferes with the function, the greater scrutiny it will
undergo. In order to survive strict scrutiny, an extremely intrusive
regulation would have to be based on a compelling interest. Thus
this model is a sliding scale.113 Critical government functions could
112. E.g., Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368 (1934).
113. Justice Marshall suggested this standard of review for equal protection in his dissents in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 51920 (1970). He stated:
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that
it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum
clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which
the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, supra at 98-99.
As applied to federalism conflicts concerning federal regulation of state
government functions, a sliding scale would have this appearance.
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be subjected to only minimal regulation unless a compelling federal
interest is demonstrated. Less significant functions could be regulated more extensively. The model would require judges to make
a two-step determination: first, the significance of the state government function involved; second, the degree of the federal inter14
ference with that function.
When this test is applied to the statehouse dome hypothetical,
the determination of lighting for a capitol building emerges as an
insignificant state function. Although the interference with state
prerogatives is great, the federal interest is high, and thus the legislation would be upheld.
Whether either this sliding scale model or another test is used
to resolve federalism dilemmas, the Court can no longer avoid
adopting a definite test for evaluating federal regulations of state
functions. The increasing complexities of modern society encourage
federal intrusion in areas as diverse as chartering private corporations"15 and regulating landing rights at locally operated airports.110
114. A sliding scale would not be foreign to Supreme Court adjudication.

The Justices in effect used this standard of review in a number of fourteenth
amendment cases involving deprivation of individual liberties through state
action. The Court apparently considers both the significance of the liberty
which was being invaded (e.g., trespass, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964), or home ownership, Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)) and the
extent of state involvement (e.g., state court decree, Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970), or amendment to the state constitution, Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369 (1967)) in reaching a result. As the right being denied became
more important, less state action was needed to bring the situation under
the fourteenth amendment and vice versa. If the case presented neither
the deprivation of a fundamental right nor extensive state action, it was
found to be outside the fourteenth amendment. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Commentators have noted a relationship similar to a sliding scale between the factors of fundamental interest and suspect classification in equal
protection. The interplay of these elements has been described as that of
intersecting variables." Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 7, 35-36 (1969), or
as related "gradients." Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HAmv. L. REV. 1065, 1120 (1969).
115. Current proposals in this field vary from a Federal Corporate Uniform Standards Act-Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974)-to actual federal chartering of
corporations. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Charteringof Corporations,31
Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).

116. Although the federal Department of Transportation authorized land-

ing of the Concorde Supersonic Transport at John F. Kennedy Airport, offi-

In the future the Court will repeatedly confront the "fundamental
constitutional question ' 117 of allocation of federal and state authority. The Court should be prepared for these controversies by formulating a viable test to evaluate conflicting federal and state
claims.

KAHLEmN G. McGuiN~zss

cials of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which controls
that airport, have refused to sanction such landings. See Fairfax Co. v. McLucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 2431 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1976).
117. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

